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Abstract 
Developing banking standards is an important process for a country’s financial and economic well 
being. Their importance incites governments to insure the stability and the performance of their banking 
systems. Accordingly, several researchers pay a particular attention to banking governance. Specifically, 
shareholders-managers’ convergence of interests and the possible repercussions of these on banks’ 
performance can be avoided only by implementing a solid system of governance. The main purpose of this 
article is to determine the impact of governance on the performance of banks, through an empirical study of a 
sample of 10 Tunisian banks during the period 1997-2007. Our empirical investigation shows a positive 
association between external administrators and performance. It is worth signaling that a high number of 
administrators results in a negative effect on performance. The results also reveal that managers lack control 
in favor of the board of directors which seems to enjoy a lot of power. This state of affairs seems to relay 
from the fact of associating the role of the manager with that of the board of directors. Finally, our results 
reveal a negative association between the presence of a group of dominant shareholders and performance, a 
phenomenon which might be explained in terms of private appropriation of benefits.  
Keywords: Banks, Corporate governance, Board of directors, Ownership structure, Performance, 
Shareholders, Managers. 
JEL classification : G32, G34 
    
 
1. Introduction  
 
The literature on corporate governance is abundant. The recent interest in this theme is centred on financial 
governance, in which a group of shareholders try to identify an economic control system. Not only are these 
shareholders a “majority”, rather the rationale for an economic control system remains distinct and different 
and is detached from the pure political and judicial requisites which associate power and majority. Hence, a 
control system is conducive to relegating the agency’s conflict, which was historically privileged in the 
agency theory literature. Agency theory primarily focused on the relationship between managers and 
shareholders. Although corporate governance theme is continuously attracting the attention of several 
researchers, the structure of banks’ governance has been discussed only recently. Discussing this issue is 
very important for many reasons, particularly in relation to developing countries. Indeed, King and Levine 
[1993] and Levine [1997] show that banks play a dominant role in financial systems and are like economic 
growth engines. In this line of thinking, several researchers, including Hermes [1994], Levine and zervos 
[1998], Rajan and  zingales [1998], Levine [1999], Beck et al. [2000], Wurgler [2000] and Caprio, Laeven 
and Levine [2007]) conclude that the stability of a banking system leads to the good functioning of the 
financial system which, in its turn, promotes economic growth. 
  
On the other hand, with regard to developing countries and their financial markets’ under-development, 
banks are an essential source of financing for companies. Berger et al. [2005] note that liberalizing bank 
systems through privatization, the reduction of the role of regulating authorities, foreign capital 
interventions, acquisitions and mergers have resulted in private and foreign control at the expense of 
governments and domestic bodies. These latter have granted bank managers more managerial and decision-
making freedom. Consequently, the problem of “agency” becomes steeper within baking industry. Thus, 
banks’ governance systems may rest on some fundamentals, namely; regulations, external mechanisms and 
internal mechanisms. Moreover, financial literature has always considered ownership structure as an 
essential mechanism for governance which allows resolution of conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and improving the value of the firm. Several researchers have shown a particular interest in the 
study of the relationship between the ownership structure and bank performance, including among others La 
Porta et al. [2002], Hasan and Marton [2003], Omrane [2003], Berger et al. [2005] and Bonin et al. [2005]. 
 
       *I would like to thank Professors Rafik Baccouch and Chaker Aloui of the University of Tunis for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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  The purpose of this article is to determine the impact of governance on the performance of banks, through 
an empirical study of a sample of 10 Tunisian banks during the period 1997-2007. This choice is informed, 
on the one hand, by the role of the banking sector in the country’s development, and on the other hand by 
the absence of exploratory studies on the Tunisian stock market.  
 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the theories and empirical studies 
conducted so far on governance. More specifically, it presents the different mechanisms on which bank 
governance structure is grounded. Section 3 empirically investigates the impact of governance on the 
performance of Tunisian banks through a study of a sample of 10 Tunisian banks during the period (1997-
2007). 
 
2. Theory and review of previous empirical studies  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, and with the financial scandals and/or the bankruptcies which ravaged 
some firms in the US and Europe, like those of Enron (2001), Vivendis Universal (2002), Ahold (2003) and 
Parmalat (2003), firms’ governance is the hot topic of the media and financial literature. Several reports 
have been published on the subject; Principles of Corporate Governance in the US in 1992, Cadburry and 
Greenburry in the United Kingdom in 1992, 1995 and 1998, Vienot in 1995 and 1999 and Bouton in 2002 in 
France. These reports have been translated into new laws and regulations manifesting the limits of the 
existing mechanisms, and provoking thus scholarly controversies on the definition of governance as well as 
on the models which are able to guarantee shareholders’ interests. This has brought to the fore the impact of 
the relevant structures and mechanisms on performance.  
 
We should mention that the discussions, the reports and the laws relative to firms’ governance are 
dominated by the “shareholder” model in which all conflicts are reduced to manager-shareholder 
relationship.  
 
2.1. The manager-shareholder traditional agency conflict  
 
Since the publication of Berle and  Means [1932] book « The modern corporation and private property », 
conflicts between shareholders and managers have been the subject of many studies aiming at integrating 
the nature of the objectives pursued by managers and whether these latter differ from those of the 
shareholders (Williamson [1963]). To explain the convergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders, Jensen and Meckling [1976] suggest three motives. The first source of conflict stems from the 
fact that investors have a perception of incurring risks different from that of the shareholders. The second 
source of conflict originates in the difference in the respective expectations of managers and shareholders. 
Finally, the third source is represented by managers’ reduction of incentives at the detriment of 
shareholders’ interests. According to Jensen and Meckling, these conflicts generate what these authors call 
“agency costs”. In this context, La Bruslerie [2003] noted that this conflict remains the most persistent due 
to the impossibility of disciplining managers. Charreaux [1997] invokes the concept of deep-rootedness. 
More specifically, according to the deep-rootedness thesis, members of the board who hold the majority of 
the shares cannot be controlled and consequently they can manage the firm at the expense of its value 
maximisation principle. According to La Bruslerie [2003], incentive theory proposes the analysis of this 
conflict with a long-term dynamic which recognizes the existence of an asymmetrical situation of 
information flow between managers and shareholders. In Canada, André and Schiehll [2004] show that the 
decrease in firms’ value is due to the convergence of interests between minority shareholders and managers 
who allow themselves to extract individual benefits from the firm.  
 
2.2. Role of indebtedness  
 
Indebtedness is one of the principal mechanisms of financial structure as it calls upon creditors to more 
supervise managers. Several studies have shown the positive role of indebtedness in the resolution of agency 
conflicts. Jensen [1986] shows that efficiently increasing debts acts on the conflicts. In the same vein, Stulz 
[1988] notes that indebtedness allows the reduction of agency costs. Similarly, La Bruslerie [2003], 
subscribing to an appropriation of individual benefits thesis, reveals that indebtedness fosters the power of 
the dominant shareholder. It allows a better control of the resources and a better investment without power 
dilution. La Bruslerie adds that indebtedness decision is linked to investment policies which are supposed to 
be profitable. It allows monitors the access to profit opportunities, earnings and wealth in the form of private 
benefits packages. Financing through debts is, within this perspective, an efficient appropriation method 
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practiced by monitors who “load” the company with debts. Nevertheless, La Bruslerie reveals a negative 
relationship between monitors’ and shareholders’ participation and the level of indebtedness.  
 
2.3. Mechanisms relative to governance and performance of banks 
 
Association of governance structure and performance has been extensively reported in the financial and 
accounting literature. Indeed, investors tend to associate specific governance mechanisms, such as 
ownership structure, board of directors structure and managers’ severance packages, with an optimal 
allocation of company’s resources and with agency cost reduction which might improve the company’s 
value. Accordingly, Charreaux [2002] points out those efficient governance mechanisms reduce costs 
relative to conflicts and, thus, maximise on shareholders’ wealth.  
 
2.3.1. Governance mechanisms 
 
The examined governance mechanisms are the board of directors (structure, size, function), the level of 
CEO ownership and the presence of a dominant shareholder as well as the type of this dominant 
shareholder.  
 
2.3.1.1. Board of directors 
 
The separation between ownership and control made it possible for the board of directors to legally exert 
important levels of power. Fama and Jensen [1983] pointed out to the importance of the board of directors 
in the monitoring process, namely within large firms. Indeed, for them, the board must act as a mechanism 
of motivation and discipline for managers in order to resolve any agency conflicts and to maximise the 
value of the firm. However, the enacted laws do not specifically elaborate on the size and structure of the 
board. In this context, Yermack [1996] have shown that the board is not any more efficient with a largest 
size. The works of Adams and Mehran [2003] on American banks point to the existence of a positive 
relationship between performance and banks having boards of directors with many members.  
 
2.3.1.2. Managerial ownership  
 
With reference to the agency theory, convergence of interests between managers and shareholders might be 
reduced through increasing managers’ share capital. Adam Smith [1776] has noted that in cases where 
owners are not managers of the firm, the latter would not act for the best interests of the owner. Byrd, 
Parrino and Pritsch [1998] noted that conflicts result from differences between job expectations, the 
assumed risk and the level of remuneration wished for by managers and shareholders. Asking managers to 
participate in the ownership of the firm might reduce these conflicts. Indeed, Fama [1980], Demsetz and 
Lehn [1985] and Barnhart and Rosenstein [1998] explain this by the fact that managers who possess stakes 
in the firm assume the consequences of the decisions harmful to the firm and profit from those which 
increase its value. It follows then that managers with important stakes in the firm provide more efforts and 
take better investment decisions. In this context, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [1988] show that performance, 
estimated by Tobin’s O-ratio, is linked to the percentage of the shares held by managers. In their study of 
North American firms, they show that if the percentage of the managers’ shares moves from 0 to 5%, 
performance goes up from 5 to 25%.  If the percentage exceeds 25%, performance improves but very 
slowly. 
 
2.3.1.3. Remuneration packages  
 
Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith [1996], Barkema and Gomez-mejia [1998] and Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker [1999] suggest that the use of motivating contracts is an essential mechanism for firms where 
managers take many decisions which cannot be easily controlled by the board of directors or by the 
investors. This result is a consequence of the agency theory which suggests that convergence of interests 
might be reduced in so far as remuneration packages are tightly linked to performance. In a same context, 
Bauer and al [2008] have shown that in Japan incentive remuneration has a positive impact on performance. 
Studying the Canadian market, André and Schiehll [2004] reveal a positive impact of independent board 
members and incentive remuneration over performance.  
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2.3.1.4. Majority shareholders 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling [1976], the more the ownership structure is dispersed, the more the 
agency costs are higher. This would mean that the presence of important shareholders is beneficial, because 
they tend to actively involve themselves in more tights monitoring activities, which would result in a more 
efficient governance structure leading to an important value for shareholders. This hypothesis has been 
empirically tested by Demsetz and Lehn [1985], Agrawal and Knoeber [1996] and Barnhart and Rosenstein 
[1998].  
 
2.3.2. Governance and performance of banks 
 
The majority of the studies conducted on governance focus on cases of firms in a general way and it was not 
until 2003 that an important number of studies have deeply treated banks’ governance structure. The fact of 
initiating the case of banks did not come by chance. In fact, according to King and Levine [1993] and 
Levine [1997], banks play a dominant role in financial systems and they represent economic growth 
engines. Other researchers like Hermes [1994], Levine and Zervos [1998], Rajan and Zingales [1998], 
Levine [1999], Beck, Levine and Loayza. [2000] and Wurgler [2000] have shown that stability of  banking 
systems leads to the well functioning of the financial system and consequently contributes to the country’s 
economic development. Recently, we notice several studies lending a special focus to the relationship 
between ownership structure and bank performance (like those of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
[2002], Hasan and Marton [2003], Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell [2004] and Bonin, Hasan and 
Wachtel [2005]).   
 
2.3.2.1. Ownership structure and bank performance  
 
Ownership structure is considered as a means which allows the resolution of agency problems arising from 
the separation between ownership functions and decision-making. To this effect, a large theoretical and 
empirical literature devoted itself to examining the impact of shares distribution among the different 
shareholders on the financial performance of firms.  
 
In the majority of developing countries, the state contributes in the ownership of banks, which would 
prevent economic growth. Omrane [2003] reveals that the state is inefficient in managing firms. Levine and 
Zervos [1998] noted that financial systems are more performing when activities are directed by the private 
sector. In a similar context, Barth, Caprio and Levine [2004] have shown that countries having highly state-
owned structures tend to have underdeveloped financial systems and consequently weak performance levels. 
Recently, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel [2005] have confirmed the existence of a negative correlation between 
state ownership and cost efficiency, and this over a sample of 225 banks of 11 east European countries 
during the period 1996-2000. In Hungary, Hasan and Marton [2003] find out that state-owned banks 
privatization and increase of foreign contributions in Hungarian banks are associated with improvement in 
profitability and profit efficiency.  
Other researches were focused on foreign presence in banks. More specifically, Weill [2006] has shown that 
foreign ownership of banks is associated with an increase in bank efficiency. Through a study of 289 banks 
of 15 countries, Fries and Taci [2005] note that costs are lower in foreign-owned banking sectors. Similarly, 
Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel [2005] investigated the impact of foreign ownership on performance. They 
showed that foreign ownership has a significant positive effect on costs as well as on banks’ profit 
efficiency.  
 
2.3.2.2. State ownership and bank performance 
 
Several authors have focused on state-owned banks. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer [2002], Barth, 
Caprio and Levine [2004], Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [2004] and Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper 
and Udell [2004] show that state-owned banks are characterized by a weak level of efficiency, non-
performing credits and restricted access to credits and consequently state property leads to slowing down the 
development of the financial system and economic growth. The work of Barth et al. [2004] over state-owned 
banks in 66 countries revealed a significant positive correlation between state property and bank inefficiency 
and a significant negative correlation between state property and financial development. Moreover, these 
authors stress that countries with higher state ownership tend to have under developed banking systems. In 
Argentina, Berger et al. [2005] have tested effects of governance structure on a sample of 18 Argentinean 
banks from 1993 till 1999. These authors have reached the conclusion that state ownership is linked with a 
weak level of performance compared to private ownership. This level of performance includes a weak 
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profitability of the return on equity (ROE) and high ratio of non performing credits. Recently, Bonin et al. 
[2005] reveal that state-owned banks are less efficient than privately-owned banks. The study shows the 
existence of a statistically non-significant negative relationship between state ownership and banks’ cost 
efficiency. The authors have based themselves on a sample of 225 banks during the period 1996-2000. 
Similarly, Barth et al. [2004] noted a negative impact of state ownership on the efficiency and development 
of the banking system. Indeed, a high state ownership is linked to several non performing credits and 
restrictive policies diminishing bank competitiveness. Finally, Bonin et al. [2005] conclude that state-owned 
banks are less efficient than privately-owned banks.  
 
2.3.2.3. Private ownership and bank performance 
 
Several studies on privatization of banks in developed and developing countries highlight the efficiency and 
good performance of privately-owned structures. Several studies have examined the effects of bank 
privatization in developed countries. Otchere and Chan [2003] point out to an improvement in the efficiency 
of Australian banks after their privatization. Similarly, Barros [2003], Gulamhussen and Guerreiro [2009] 
have shown that efficiency of Portuguese banks have increased with privatization. Other studies examined 
privatization in developing countries. In the majority of these countries, control structure of several 
privatized banks has been transformed from state-owned to privately-owned. Other studies on the Brazilian 
context by Beck, Crivelli and Summerhill [2005] and Nakane and Bauhmol-Weintraub [2005], on Mexico 
by Haber [2005], on Nigéria by Beck, Cull and Jerome [2005] and on Pakistan by Bonaccorsi Di Patt and 
Hardy [2005] have revealed an improvement in bank performance after privatization. Other studies like 
those of Beck, Cull and Jerome [2005] and Haber [2005] have shown signs of cautiousness in granting 
credits after privatization and this in view of reducing non-performing credits. Similarly and on the basis of 
18 Argentinean banks, Berger et al. [2005] have attempted to test the effects of governance structure on 
bank performance during the period 1993-1999. This study has shown that banks which opted for 
privatization witnessed a decrease in non-performing credits ratios.  
 
3. The empirical investigation 
 
Our study focuses bank governance in Tunisia. This choice is dictated by the role played by banks in the 
development of the country, and more specifically in the development of the financial market, which has 
been classified as an emerging market. Moreover, banks are considered as special institutions for many 
reasons. First, the structure of the balance sheet of banks is different from those of other institutions. In fact, 
they are characterized by a high debts/equity ratio, since they largely depend on deposits received from 
customers. Likewise, the stability of the banking sector is the key to the stability of the country’s financial 
system, and the economy in general because failure of a bank might lead to serious economic problems. 
This is why governments pay a special attention to the stability of the financial system. In order to measure 
the performance of the firms, several studies have been conducted (Charreaux [1998], Berger et Patti 
[2006]). The used performance measures are distinguished into three categories. 
The accounting measures, the stock measures or a combination of the two measures. Accounting measures 
use the return rate of assets or the return rate of equity. Nevertheless, these measures fall short in 
considering the essential element in the evaluation of any return, i.e. the risk. Stock measures use classic 
performance measures, which are the measures of Sharpe, of Jensen, of Treynor and of Fama. Finally, 
Marris ratio [1964] (which is a report on market capitalization by equity) and Tobin’s Q [1958] (which is a 
report on the firm’s market value by the value of the assets) who are two measures which call upon 
accounting and stock values.  
 
3.1. The Tunisian context: A brief description 
 
Tunisia has established several reforms on its financial system during the 1990s in order to respond to the 
technological as well as to the economic mutations it is undergoing. Three management systems are 
invoked; the market-oriented system (Anglo-Saxon model), the network-oriented system (German Nippon 
model) and the intermediary system (French-Italian model). The management system adopted by Tunisia is 
the intermediary system which is a combination of the Anglo-Saxon model and the French-Italian model. 
This choice has been introduced in the new trade code in November 2000.  
 
 3.2. Data and variable specification  
 
 The study investigates a number of 10 Tunisian clearing banks during a period of ten years (1997-2007), 
totalling 110 observations. The data have been collected with reference to the financial statements 
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published by these banks and stock information delivered by the board of the financial market. The choice 
of the period represents the beginning of the electronic quotation system put in place in October 1996.  
 
  In order to study the impact of financial structure mechanisms on bank performance, we proceed with a 
panel-based multiple linear regression, in which the dependent variable is performance and the financial 
structure mechanisms as explanatory variables.  
 
  The dependent variable that we are examining is the future anticipated performance as assessed by Tobin’s 
Q. This ratio is the most used ratio to integrate accounting and stocks measures. It helps give an idea about 
value creation by directly confronting market value calculated over future anticipated returns and assets 
substitution value.  
 
  Future performance Qit, is measured at the end of the financial term that follows the period in which 
information about governance is obtained. Setting Tobin’s Q measure at this date allows ensuring that the 
market is recognizable of all the mechanisms, knowing that the mechanisms might take time to be better 
reflected in the given value and preventing in part endogeniety problems related to measuring the set of 
variables in a contemporaneous fashion.   
 
  The choice of the explanatory variables is inspired by different studies like those of Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) and Core et al. [1999]. 
 
  3.3. The model  
 
  Our aim is to examine the following relationship, 
 
            Qit = f (PMIit, PMAit, ADit, CDit, EDit, TCAit, PAEit, REit, DPCit, TBit, SPit)        
   where 
 Qit :  Tobin’s Q of a bank i at the end of a year t measured by the total of assets market value + the 
accounting value of debts + the value of privileged shares’ buyout divided by the accounting 
value of the asset. 
 PMIit :  Presence of minorities. It takes the value of 1 when one or more shareholders hold a maximum 
of 5% of the capital. It takes 0 otherwise.  
PMAit : Presence of majorities. It takes the value of 1 when one or more shareholders hold a maximum 
of 20% of the capital. It takes 0 otherwise.  
ADit :  length of service of managers in the bank. It represents the number of years in the post of a 
manager. It is measured through a logarithm.  
CDit :  substitution of the bank’s manager. It takes the value of 1 if the manager has been substituted 
during the period of study. Otherwise, it takes 0.  
EDit :  experience of the manager defined by the number of years in a similar post. It is measured 
through a logarithm.  
TCAit :  number of administrators who are members of the board. It is measured through a logarithm.  
PAEit :  percentage of external administrators.  
REit:  debt ratio defined by the total of long and mid term debts over the total of assets.  
DPCit :  the control of the manager by the board of directors. It takes the value of 1 when there is no 
control. In other words, the manager preside the board. Otherwise it takes the value of 0.  
TBit :  size of the bank measured by the logarithm of the total assets.  
SPit :  ownership structure. It takes the value of 1 if the bank is state-owned (or partly owned), and 0 if 
it is private.  
 
3.4. Descriptive analysis of data 
 
In a first part and through a statistical analysis, we will assess the main characteristics of financial structure 
on banks’ performance.   
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The first observation reveals the redundancy 
of the variable PMI with a mean of 1 showing thus the presence of minorities in all the banks. This is 
expected since the sample includes quoted banks. Moreover, the presence of this variable in the model 
created a multicolinearity problem and consequently it has to be eliminated. The mean of managers’ years 
of service in a bank is approximately 3 years. This shows the rotative principle that managers undergo. This 
might be due to state intervention in appointing managers. The variable ED, which represents managers’ 
experience in others similar posts is, on average, equal to 7. This might foresee the inexperience of 
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managers. Equally, we might note the intervention of the state since the manager has to have the 
endorsement of the Central Bank of Tunisia and consequently the endorsement of the state since the 
position is political rather than administrative. The variable CD reveals that on average 60% of managers 
changed position during the period of study. The variable TCA shows that on average the board of directors 
is composed of 10 members.  The variable PAE indicates that on average 86.38 % of administrators are 
externals. The debt ratio RE is on average of 8.16 % and in the worst case it did not exceed 25% (initial 
data). We note that 82.5 % of managers preside the board of directors hence the absence of their control. 
Moreover, we notice that 48.75 % of banks are state-owned or partly so. Nevertheless, during these years 
there was the privatization of the BS and UIB banks which reduced the rate from 48.75 % to 30 % since, 
according to our sample, only three banks out of ten remained partly state-owned; the BNA, STB and BH. 
Finally, performance standard deviation is relatively high (58. 94). This is may be explained by banks’ 
performance which ranges from 24.94 to 288.68. 
 
3.5. Econometric analysis  
 
As we have mention above, the aim of this study is to examine the impact of governance over banks 
performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. To this effect, we suggest to use a panel-based linear regression 
model.  
 
Qit =  + 1 PMIit + 2 PMAit + 3 ADit + 4 CDit + 5 EDit + 6 TCAit + 7 PAEit + 8 REit + 
9 DPCit + 10 TBit + 11 SPit + it                                                                                        [1] 
 
In this model, the index i designates the bank (i =1,……, 10), whereas the index (t) designates the year 
under consideration  (t=1997,……., 2007). 
 
Our main question is: do we use a fixed-effect model or a random-effect model. To sort this out, we will 
use Haussmann test. In the context of our sample, the P-value of the Haussmann test is equal to 0.7239, 
neatly superior to 5%. This result allows us to conclude that assessing the models’ parameters through a 
random effect approach is the most adequate.  
 
Assessing the model gave us the following result (the values between parentheses represent the P-value)*: 
 
Qit = 1932.983 - 31.813PMAit + 2.137ADit – 19.132CDit + 2.152EDit – 151.442TCAit + 64.129PAEit + 
         (0.000)*     (0.000)*          (0.520)*        (0.104)*       (0.474)*         (0.005)*           (0.492)* 
 102.889REit – 22.057DPCit – 103.768TBit + 5.749SPit                                                                          [2] 
 (0.000)*         (0.000)*             (0.000)*         (0.783)* 
 
   with  R² = 0.901 and F = 63.053. 
The P-value for the estimated parameters shows that the variables SP, AD, PAE and ED are the most 
insignificant for this model. This observation led us to analyse the correlation matrix of the different 
explanatory variables. The matrix shows us that the variable AD correlates with the variables CD, ED and 
SP. Similarly, it shows a correlation between the variable SP with the variables AD, CD, ED, PAE and TB 
(the correlation coefficients vary between 0.72 and 0.81).  
 
More specifically, the variables AD and SP represent a colinearity problem with the other variables. We 
can explain the irrelevance of these variables, whether the bank is state-owned, partly-owned or private, as 
they have no effect on its performance since the variable PS represents ownership structure. Years of 
service have no effect on bank performance since AD represents the manager’s years of service within the 
bank. This might be explained by the fact that managers are appointed by the state and even private banks 
have to consult with trusteeship, represented by the central bank, in order to appoint a manager.  
 
Moreover, we should note as well the size of the constant as well as the parameters to estimate. This result 
is expected since the variables of governance, except the size of the bank (TB) and the number of 
administrators (TCA), approximate the value of 1 and hence is very small in contrast to the dependent 
variable (Q) which is on average equal to 104.88 (see table 1). These results lead us to not consider the two 
variables mentioned above (i.e. SP and AD). The correlation matrix confirms the independence of these 
variables.  
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The model becomes as follows:  
 
Qit =  + 1 PMAit + 2 EDit + 3 CDit + 4 TCAit + 5 PAEit + 6 REit + 7 DPCit + 8 TBit + it   
                                                                                                                                                                 [3]                                                                                                    
 
The estimation of this model with a random-effect approach leads to: 
  
Qit = 1933. 3 - 34.012PMAit  – 16.87CDit + 3.438EDit – 163.296TCAit + 85.349PAEit + 95.601REit – 
        (0.000)*   (0.000)*            (0.003)*       (0.019)*       (0.000)*            (0.009)*           (0.001)* 
  21.241DPCit – 102.859TBit                                                                                                                   [4] 
 (0.000)*            (0.000)*                  
 
  with R² = 0.907 and F = 87.049. 
The regression analysis revealed the following results; a statistically significant positive relation between 
the proportion of external administrators (PAE) and performance (Q), in accordance with several studies 
(Mace, 1986 and Kamran et al., 2006). This might be explained by the fact that the presence of external 
administrators strongly contributes to banks performance. The coefficients of the model [4] do not confirm 
the effect expected by agency theory, i.e. the effect of dominant shareholders (PMA) on banks 
performance. Instead of a positive effect, the estimated coefficient presents a negative association (-
34.012). This opens up the way for an explanation in terms of a private appropriate of benefits. Lack of 
managers’ control by the board of directors (DPC) has as well a negative effect over performance. The 
model [4] yields a coefficient equal to (-21.241). The high number of the board’s members (TCA) has a 
very negative effect over performance with a coefficient equal to (-163.296). This is explained by the fact 
that this board has no role in managers’ decisions and consequently this role is negative. Substituting the 
manager (CD) negatively influences performance (a coefficient equal to (-16.87)). In line with agency 
theory, the association between the function of the president of the board and the role of the manager 
(DPC) negatively influences performance.  
 
4. Summary and some concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this article was the study of ownership structure, the system and mechanisms of governance 
within Tunisian banks and the analysis of their performance as well as the examination of the nature of the 
link between them and the factors mentioned above. Through an econometric model and a sample of 10 
banks quoted in Tunis Stock Exchange, this study allowed establishing associations between bank 
performance and three main attributes of governance structure: the structure of the board, contribution of 
managers and contribution of dominant shareholders.  
 
The results of this study revealed a positive relationship between external administrators and performance. 
This is explained by the fact that the presence of external administrators strongly contributes to banks’ 
performance. We should mention that a high number of administrators may create a negative effect on 
performance. In other words, the presence of external administrators is necessary, but on the other hand 
reducing the number of administrators is needed. These results have revealed as well lack of managers’ 
control by the board of directors. This observation streams from the fact of associating the role of manager 
with that of the president of the board. In as far as the monitoring role of important shareholders, our results 
yield to a negative association giving room to an explanation in terms of private appropriate of benefits. 
Accordingly, we suggest increasing the number of external administrators at the expense of other 
administrators. This mechanism would play a moderating role in banks and generally in companies tightly 
controlled. Besides, it is preferable to separate the function of manager from that of president of the board. 
Finally, the hasty substitution of managers should be avoided to ensure more stability.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  
Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Q 104.8810 85.5475 288.6793 24.9364 58.9447 
PMI 1 1 1 1 0 
PMA 0.6 1 1 0 0.4898 
AD 1.1771 1.0986 2.4849 0 0.8167 
CD 0.6 1 1 0 0.4898 
ED 1.7862 1.7917 2.7080 0 0.5746 
TCA 2.3913 2.4849 2.4849 2.1972 0.1049 
PAE 0.8638 0.9 0.9167 0.6667 0.0733 
RE 0.0816 0.0503 0.2510 0.0041 0.0684 
DPC 0.825 1 1 0 0.3799 
TB 14.3830 14.3252 15.2712 13.5879 0.4533 
SP 0.4875 0 1 0 0.4998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
